Deep-hole blasting and chamber blasting technology are widely used in mining and large-scale earth-rock excavation or landfill projects, due to their advantages of high efficiency and low cost. However, their use is often accompanied by misfire accidents, and generally misfire is relatively hidden, as well as difficult to quickly detect and identify, making misfire the greatest potential safety hazard in blasting construction. This paper presents a method and system of frequency division multiple access (FDMA) detection and recognition for blasting misfire, based on electromagnetic wave propagation theory and radio frequency identification technology. Next, the feasibility of frequency division multiple access (FDMA) misfire detection method is analyzed by means of theoretical deduction. Combining field and laboratory tests, it is concluded that the existence of underground misfire with a linear distance of 225 m can be detected. In addition, the detection frequency range is 975-5025 Hz, and the recognition accuracy of multi-frequency signal can reach 2 Hz. The stability of the electric detonator in an electromagnetic environment is discussed, and the danger criterion of the electric detonator in the electromagnetic environment is obtained. When the power of the signal transmitter is less than 120 W and the induction area of the electric detonation network is less than 0.5 m 2 , then the electric detonator is safe. The misfire detection and recognition system has been successfully applied in a deep-hole blasting of an open-pit quarry. It is observed that when the distance between millisecond blasting holes is equal to greater than 5 m, the detection signals between holes will not interfere with each other. This paper provides a reliable, systematic and complete research method for remote wireless detection and identification of misfire, and also provides a basis for the safety of blasting construction and misfire detection in related projects.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term blasting technology refers to an engineering technique that utilizes the energy of explosives to destroy the original structure of an object and achieve the method of dispensing and detonating the medicine package for different engineering purposes. Most of the world's metal mines and non-metallic mines, large earth and stone excavation or dumping projects mainly use chamber blasting and deep hole blasting techniques to break rocks [1] , [2] . Chamber blasting is a blasting technology in which the chamber or well lane The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Vyasa Sai.
is used as a special charging space to fill a large amount of explosives, so as to achieve a blasting fracture, caving or throwing a large amount of soil rock. The term deep-hole blasting refers to the blasting method in which the diameter of the borehole is greater than 50 mm and the depth of the borehole is greater than 5 m [3] .
During the blasting construction process, due to many uncertain factors, the detonation kit (detonator and fuse) may be triggered by bonfire blasting or unexploded explosives [4] , [5] .Once misfires occur, they may easily lead to major safety hazards if not detected, identified, and eliminated quickly and effectively. Misfire accidents are numerous both in China and throughout the world each year. In 1983, a misfire accident occurred in the Huidong Lead-Zinc Mine located in Sichuan Province, which resulted in dozens of casualties [6] . On October 16, 2008 and October 14, 2009 , two major safety accidents involving misfire explosions occurred in the coal mine of the Ningxia high-temperature burning area, which led to a total of 30 deaths and 55 injured and/or disabled [7] , [8] . According to the statistical data of the South Africa Mining and Energy Department, 30 to 40% of the casualties related to blasting accidents are due to failures in effective identifications and improper handling of misfire situations [9] . Verakis and Lobb [10] investigated 195 blasting accidents in open-pit mines in the United States between 1978 and 2001, among which eleven (5.64%) were determined to be misfire accidents [11] . The first step in handling a misfire situation is to accurately detect and identify the number and locations of the misfires.
In explosive detection, based on the principles of electrochemical reaction, pyrolysis and gas-phase reaction, radiation and labeling of explosive biochemical reaction products, a variety of mobile or hand-held devices [12] - [14] have been developed for airport baggage inspection, mine detection and environmental monitoring of explosive contamination sites. The above is mainly aimed at the detection of explosives above ground and shallow buried, which couldn't meet the detection requirements of deep buried underground explosives. Mishra et al. [15] and Ma and Ren [16] discussed the application prospects of RFID technology in the management of mining services such as detonator and auxiliary charge transportation, inventory management, safety, tracking and identification, and miner positioning. It was found that the technology of RuBee could achieve long-distance reading without interference from rock or metal media, making it possible to trace detonators. The detection range of this method depends on the antenna coverage, and the recognition speed is slow. The working time is limited by the quality of batteries in detonator labels and the cost [17] , [18] . Misfire can be divided into three forms [5] : (i) none of detonators and explosives exploded; (ii) detonators exploded, explosives were not detonated; (iii) detonators exploded, explosives were not fully detonated. The method mentioned above only marks and identifies detonators or auxiliary charges, and it is easy to misjudge blind artillery in (ii) and (iii) cases. Some scholars have proposed the method of indirect misfire recognition. Li et al. [19] conducted real-time analysis of the vibration signals monitored in millisecond blasting sites based on a timeenergy density method of wavelet transformation and used the energy mutations of the signals to identify the segments of the misfired detonators, which allowed the approximate positions to be determined. Unfortunately, this method has been found to have a low precision rate and complicated operation process. Therefore, is not applicable for front-line technicians in complicated blasting environments. In another related study, based on the characteristics of the quantizable calculations of the precise time delays for high-precision electronic detonators, and combined with a blasting vibration wave method, Yan and Zhang [20] identified misfires through comparisons of the design delays and vibration peak values. However, this method not only required high precision detonators, but it also relied on very detailed engineering geological conditions. Therefore, this method not only requires high accuracy of detonators, but also fully grasps the geological conditions of the blasting area. Otherwise, it is difficult to calculate the specific location and number of misfire.. In the studies conducted by Wang et al. [21] which were based on a designed misfire identification system with a STC89C52 single-chip, misfires were identified according to whether the blast-hole displacement signals had jumped during specific periods. The accuracy of this method was not found to be high for deep-chamber blasting processes. In addition, ZigBee technology [22] , [23] , three-dimensional laser scanning technology, electromagnetic wave tomography (CT) technology, and ground penetrating radar (GPR) technology [24] were becoming more and more mature, which can be used for non-destructive detection of a certain depth of rock mass, but the detection accuracy of chamber blasting at depths close to or more than 100 meters is often not up to the requirements. In the absence of mature misfire detection equipment, misfire identification is usually carried out on the blasting site by combining the shape, degree of fragmentation and blasting design with engineering experience, which is subjective. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a low-cost, efficient and accurate equipment for misfire detection and recognition.
Liu et al. [25] - [27] conducted feasibility research regarding passive source misfire detections and identifications, and proposed a high-precision magnetic method, transient electromagnetic method, and transient electromagnetic coupling method to detect and identify chamber blasting misfires by using geophysical methods. The research results indicated that the above-mentioned methods were feasible in theory. However, the overall cost, detection depths, and identification precision rates could not simultaneously meet the blasting engineering requirements for misfire identifications. Therefore, based on a theoretical analysis of the active source detection method, this study put forward a frequency division multiple access detection method based on radio frequency technology for misfire detections and identifications. In addition, a complete set of equipment for the rapid detection and identification of misfires in geotechnical blasting processes was developed in this study. Both outdoor and indoor experimental tests and field applications were carried out in order to examine the proposed method's performance. A brief analysis of the research results and application prospects of the proposed misfire detection system was also presented.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
Exciting results of rapid detection and identification of misfire in geotechnical blasting are obtained via deep-hole blasting field tests, as well as electric detonator chamber blasting and stability tests, in an electromagnetic environment. The main contributions of this paper to the safety of blasting VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. CMDS-I misfire rapid detection and recognition system for geotechnical blasting and frequency division multiple access method.
construction and misfire detection in related projects are summarized as follows.
• Based on electromagnetic propagation theory and radio frequency identification technology, a wireless remote blasting misfire rapid detection and location identification system is proposed, in particular that for application in deep hole and chamber blasting.
• The system of misfire detection and identification for geotechnical blasting is popularized and applied, which provides a basis for judging the safety of blasting construction and misfire detection for related projects.
• The paper provides accurate and reliable data for misfire processing.
• The paper provides reference for the research and development of underground wireless remote detection and identification technology and personnel location and tracking technology. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce the composition and cost of misfire detection system for chamber (deep-hole) blasting. In Section III, the feasibility, distinguishability and anti-jamming of radio frequency identification technology in misfire detection and identification are experimentally studied. Next, the stability criterion of electric detonators in electromagnetic environment is determined by the results of the experiments in Section IV. Section V discusses the problems and development direction of misfire detection and recognition, and Section VI offers some concluding comments.
II. MISFIRE DETECTION SYSTEM FOR CHAMBER (DEEP-HOLE) BLASTING
The misfire detection system for chamber (deep-hole) blasting was developed based on radio frequency identification technology. The system consists of underground signal transmitter and ground detection part. The underground signal generator consists of a time controller, a frequency controller and a power amplifier module. The above-ground detection part consists of a broadband magnetic field sensor, a data acquisition module and a display and control terminal. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) method was used to detect and identify misfire. Fixed-frequency electromagnetic signal transmitters are pre-installed in each chamber (borehole). Fixed-frequency electromagnetic signals are detected by ground wireless receivers before and after blasting from various underground explosives (boreholes). Different misfire addresses (FDMA) were corresponded to different frequency signals, and signal transmitters after blasting. There is no signal when it is destroyed. The difference between the received signal before and after the explosion was compared to determine whether there is a misfire and its location. Fig. 1 is a CMDS-I Misfire Rapid Detection and Recognition System and Frequency Division Multiple Access Method for Geotechnical Blasting. The misfire detection system for chamber (deep-hole) blasting was developed based on radio frequency identification technology. The system consists of underground signal transmitter and ground detection part. The underground signal generator consists of a time controller, a frequency controller and a power amplifier module. The above-ground detection part consists of a broadband magnetic field sensor, a data acquisition module and a display and control terminal. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) method was used to detect and identify misfire. Fixed-frequency electromagnetic signal transmitters are pre-installed in each chamber (borehole). Fixed-frequency electromagnetic signals are detected by ground wireless receivers before and after blasting from various underground explosives (boreholes). Different misfire addresses (FDMA) were corresponded to different frequency signals, and signal transmitters after blasting. There is no signal when it is destroyed. The difference between the received signal before and after the explosion was compared to determine whether there is a misfire and its location. Fig. 1 
is a CMDS-I Misfire Rapid Detection and Recognition System and Frequency Division Multiple Access
Method for Geotechnical Blasting.
As can be seen from Fig. 1 , the surface detection terminal is wired to a high sensitive electromagnetic coupling antenna, with a maximum detection range of 200 m. There are two kinds of signal transmitters: chamber and deep hole, which are 750 mm in diameter, 20 days in maximum working time, 80 W in transmitting power, 100 m in maximum recognition depth and 29 dollars in single cost; chamber blasting signal transmitter with 50 mm in diameter, 150 mm in length, 4 days in maximum working time, 1 W in transmitting power, 30 m in maximum recognition depth, and 0.8 dollars in single cost; and deep-hole blasting signal transmitter with a diameter of 70 mm, a length of 230 mm, a maximum working time of 7 days, a transmission power of 5∼20 W, a maximum identification depth of 60 m and a single cost of 1 dollars were introduced. The system has good frequency division multiple access capability in the range of 975∼5025Hz. In order to meet the requirements of simple and reliable operation, high precision, high efficiency, low cost and small size of the detection equipment, a hand-held flat-panel mobile terminal has been developed, which realizes long-distance wireless connection between antenna and terminal and unmanned carrier, so as to make the detection process safer and more extensive. In the fierce global market competition, the detection system is constantly upgrading to meet the complex and changeable on-site use environment.
III. RFID TECHNOLOGY IN MISFIRE DETECTION AND RECOGNITION EXPERIMENTS
The main difficulties in the rapid detection and identification of misfires are as follows: i) The lack of theory and application systems for the rapid detections and identifications of blasting misfires; ii) As far as the characteristics of chamber and deep-hole blasting are concerned, in both blasting processes, a large number of explosives are buried at depths of greater than 10 m, to as much as 100 m deep [3] . Due to the complexity and diversity of the blasting conditions, there are only small differences in the dielectric constant between the explosives and rock masses (soil), and large differences between the misfire volumes and blasting volumes. Therefore, it is very difficult to detect and identify the misfires; iii) Chamber and deep-hole blasting charge is large and dispersed, so the accuracy, efficiency and resolution of misfire detection and identification are required. In view of the above difficulties, the following analysis and experiments were carried out respectively.
A. MEASURABLE RANGE OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNAL
The rock mass muck piles which are left after blasting are semi-conductive medium with certain conductivity. When electromagnetic waves propagate in rock and soil, they will generate conductive currents under the actions of the heat of the electromagnetic fields, which results in losses of electromagnetic wave energy. Therefore, the propagation distances of the electromagnetic waves in rock and soil will be limited, and the higher the conductivity of the medium, the greater the attenuation and shorter the propagation distances [28] . In the electromagnetic wave detections of the misfires in chamber (deep-hole) blasting, the emission frequencies of the electromagnetic waves should be as low as possible [29] in order to meet the depth requirements of the blasting misfire detections. The key to the feasibility of an active source detection method is whether the signals emitted by the signal transmitter can cause resolvable electromagnetic anomalies at set ground observation points. Fig. 2 details an average amplitude spectrum of the horizontal component of a natural magnetotelluric field. It is known that as long as the signals induced by the ground is larger than those of the natural electromagnetic signals, the transmitted signals can be identified.
In this study, an XYZ coordinate system was used, where XY is the horizontal plane and Z is the vertical axis. Then, by assuming the magnetic moment vector of the single-turn harmonic small current loop (current I, area S, magnetic moment value m = IS) is on the YZ vertical plane, and at that the original point is M = mu x , then the electromagnetic field generated by the magnetic dipoles can be written as follows: 
where u x , u y , and u z indicate the unit vector along the direction of x, y, and z respectively, and k = √ −iωµ/ρ. Therefore, when y = z = 0, r = x, the magnetic field on the axis of the current loop will be as follows:
In other words, there will be only a magnetic field at the x direction, while the electric field on the axis is 0, and so on, and Ez = 0.
Also, when x = y = 0 m, r = z, the magnetic field on the plane where the current loop is located will be as follows:
Namely, there is only a magnetic field at the x direction, while the electric field will be as follows:
In accordance with the direct calculation of the formula, Fig. 3 illustrates the curve for the changes in the magnetic fields Hz and Hc, with the electrical field Ex having four frequencies (1 Hz, 10 Hz, 1 kHz, 10 kHz) with the distance r when the magnetic moment is 100 A·m 2 , and the surrounding rock resistivity is ρ = 1000 hm. The unit of H is A/m and the unit of E is V/m. Therefore, in order to facilitate a comparison with an average natural electromagnetic field, this unit is classified as the consistent unit with the average natural electromagnetic field. The conversion relationship will be as follows: 1 A/m = 4π × 10 −7 T = 4π × 10 2 nT, 1 V/m = 10 6 mV/km.
In this study, the average electromagnetic field of the natural field, as well as the variation curves of electromagnetic fields with distance r when the frequencies were 1 Hz, 10 Hz, 1 kHz, and 10 kHz, respectively, were compared. The theoretical estimation data of the detectable maximum distances at the four frequencies of the harmonic magnetic dipole sources were obtained by taking the distances which corresponded to at least one order of magnitude larger than the amplitude of natural average field as the resolvable distances, as shown in Table 1 .
The vertical distances from the misfire detection chambers to the ground were approximately a maximum of 100 m. In order to ensure safety and avoid misfires being suddenly detonated by unknown factors during the detection processes, it was necessary to maintain a certain distance away from the explosion positions during the ground detections. Due to the fact that the average amplitude spectrum of the natural field had the weakest magnetic field signal (near the frequency band of 1 to 10 kHz), and the propagation distances of the electromagnetic signals with frequencies of 1 to 10 kHz in the rock and soil layer could also meet the requirements, it was found to be more convenient to detect the misfires if the frequencies of the signal transmissions were selected at frequency points between to 1 to 10 kHz.
B. DISCERNIBILITY TEST OF DIFFERENT SIGNAL DETECTION FOR MULTI-POINT MISFIRE
This study's testing area was located in the Piaotang tungstentin mining area, which is located 10 km northeast of Dayu County, Ganzhou City, Jiangxi Province. The test scope was in the middle of the No. III ore belt (above the middle level of 496) and between the surface No. 4 and No. 8 exploration lines. The surrounding rock of the ore body was determined to be middle-upper Cambrian metamorphic sandstone. The strike of ore body was NWW, with a tilt toward the north, and a dip angle of 80 • . The ore bodies were exposed to the surface, and the rock masses were weathered. The drift layers had spacings of approximately ten meters, and their section sizes were 2.5×2.5 m 2 . In this study, due to the limited size of the chamber, the signal transmitter was required to be as small in size as possible, while still ensuring that the signal transmitter signals were sufficient for the ground receiver to detect. For this reason, the signal transmitter which was used in this study was designed according to the volume requirements of the chamber space as follows: T 1 signal transmitter it has been concluded that when the transmission frequency is close to 1 kHz, the signal could be distinguished the farthest distance. The experiment of transmitting frequency of signal transmitter between 100 Hz and 10 kHz is carried out, and the predominant frequency was between 975 Hz to 5025 Hz.
The experiment was divided into two groups: surface receiving ground launching and ground receiving ground launching ground receiving. When receiving the underground launching surface, the transmitter is placed in the underground roadway of the mine, and the vertical distance between the transmitter and the surface is 68∼82 m. The transmitter frequency and the position of the receiving point are changed to carry out the test of the electromagnetic signal penetrating the rock mass. See Fig. 4 for the schematic test of electromagnetic signal testability.
Two sets of test results with transmission frequency of 2500 Hz were analyzed. The ground receiver receives the original electromagnetic signal of a certain transmitting frequency from the transmitter as a time series signal, which is not significantly different from the background electromagnetic signal received when passive, except for its amplitude. It needs to be processed by Fast Fourier Time-Frequency Transform (FFT). The processing results are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 .
After FFT transformation, the received signal was one order of magnitude different from the natural magnetic field signal at the frequency of T 1 and T 2 emission signals, which can be distinguished clearly and has a high signal-to-noise ratio. The electric field signal has no obvious change at the radio-frequency rate, was greatly disturbed by the background field and has a low signal-to-noise ratio. The magnetic field signal was detected and analyzed in engineering applications to identify misfire.
For chamber blasting with multiple chambers, at least one transmitter was placed in each chamber to emit electromagnetic signals at a specific frequency, so as to detect the existence of misfire. This requires that the detection system has a good frequency resolution in the pre-selected frequency band of 975∼5025 Hz, which meets the limit state of the number of chambers in chamber blasting. The frequency resolution of chamber blasting misfire detection and recognition system refers to the ability to separate two adjacent spectral peaks. In practical application, it refers to the minimum interval to distinguish two different frequency signals.
The frequency division multiple access (FDMA) method for blasting misfires emits different frequency signals at VOLUME 7, 2019 different detonation points. It the FDMA method, ground sensors detect the frequencies of the transmitted signals in order to determine whether misfires have occurred or not and then determines the positions of the misfires according to the blasting design. Among these, the key is to effectively distinguish the frequencies of the detected signals. A Fast Fourier transform (FFT) is used to calculate the spectrum acquisitions. The spectrum resolution accuracy f of the FFT is related to the sampling frequencies f s and analysis lengths N fft of the signals. Its relational expression can be written as follows: Fig. 7 shows the FFT results of the same signal when the N fft were 1,024 and 4,096 respectively. It can be seen that the frequency spectrum accuracy when the N fft was equal to 4,096 was higher than that when the N fft was equal to 1,024, which indicated that the frequency points obtained by the FFT were denser, and the frequency resolution was higher. Therefore, according to the above relationships, the sampling parameters and data analysis parameters could be reasonably adjusted, and the transmission frequency could be set at the frequency points obtained by the FFT transform. As a result, multiple frequency signals could be effectively distinguished. The average value of the multi-segment FFT frequency spectrum was used in the actual measurements for random noise suppression.
The resolvability test scheme of multi-frequency signals was as follows: T 1 and T 2 signal transmitters were placed in the roadway with 496 m height (at the signal transmitter in Fig. 4 (b) , 25 m apart, and the signals were detected on the surface. The transmission frequencies of T 1 and T 2 were set at 975 Hz to 5025 Hz, and the frequency difference was set at 2 Hz to 4050 Hz. Through setting different transmission frequencies and changing the detection position on the ground, 200 tests had been carried out. During the test, two transmitters work at the same time. The single-frequency-time spectrum obtained from three groups of frequency experiments (see Fig. 8 ) was selected for analysis.
As can be seen in the test results detailed in Fig. 8 , the response amplitude of the signal transmitter was obviously higher than the background field amplitude in the 10 to 20 second working time. It was observed that when the minimum interval frequencies of the T 1 and T 2 were 2 Hz, the energy amplitude of the detected T 1 transmitting signal had reached nearly 650 units, and the energy amplitude of the T 2 transmitting signal had reached nearly 100 units. These could be obviously distinguished, and were found to satisfy the requirements of the multi-frequency signals which had been distinguished in the frequency division multiple access detection method.
C. ANTI-INTERFERENCE TEST OF ADJACENT BOREHOLES
In blasting engineering, there is a long distance between large chamber blasting chambers, so the influence of adjacent boreholes in deep hole blasting is mainly considered. Deep-hole blasting usually has a hole diameter greater than 50 mm, a hole depth greater than 15 m, and a large charge in a single hole. In order to control the blasting fragmentation and reduce the blasting vibration hazard, millisecond interval detonation is adopted, which will lead to the pre-blasting holes to destroy the unexploded holes and the signal transmitter preset therein. In order to verify the influence of chamber (borehole) blasting on adjacent chamber (borehole) misfire detection launcher, an open-pit earth-rock peeling blasting test was conducted in Dabao mountain Mine, Shaoguan, Guangdong Province. The step height of the open-pit stope is 15 mm, the hole depth is 16.5 mm and the hole diameter is 140 mm. Considering the safety and maneuverability of the test, the detection holes and boreholes in abandoned mined-out areas were tested, and the depth of the detection holes was 20∼70 m. Deep-hole bench blasting generally adopts ''large hole spacing, small row spacing'' to control blasting fragmentation. In the test area, ''triangular'' hole spacing of 6 m and 5 m row spacing is adopted. The minimum distance between adjacent holes is 5.8 m. See Fig. 9 (a) . Three groups of experiments were designed. The charge in the hole near the free surface, the charge in the adjacent hole, no charge in the adjacent hole, the preset signal transmitter and the adjacent distance were set to exceed, equal to and less than the actual value of the three groups, which were 5, 5.8 and 6 m, respectively. See Fig. 9 (b) and (c).
Signal transmitters were pre-installed in both charge and unloaded boreholes, with buried depth h=8 m and firing frequency f =2025 Hz. They were tested on the ground before and after blasting, and the ground detection distances were s=0, 10 and 20 m, respectively. Before blasting, different signals in each borehole could be clearly identified. After blasting, launchers in charge boreholes were destroyed, and signals emitted by corresponding boreholes could not be detected. Specific signals could be detected in the non-charge boreholes. Taking the minimum distance between adjacent holes (5 m) as an example, the test results are shown in Fig. 10 .
In Fig. 10 , the amplitude of signal intensity changes little before and after blasting. It can be seen that the explosion of VOLUME 7, 2019 adjacent boreholes would not affect the normal work of the signal transmitter. This is because in bench blasting, explosive energy is mainly released to the direction of the minimum resistance line, only a small part of the energy causes certain damage to the retained rock mass, and the transmitted energy is insufficient to destroy the launcher in the unloaded hole. Experiments showed that the misfire detection system has a certain anti-interference ability when the adjacent boreholes are detonated one by one.
IV. SAFETY ANALYSIS
The influences of the power of the signal transmitters and the transmitters' distances from the electrical explosion networks, as well as the inductive areas of the electric explosion networks and the transmitting frequencies of the signal transmitters, on the safety of the electrical detonators were mainly only examined using laboratory test methods. The rectangular and circular signal transmitters were provided with basic parameters, as shown in Table 2 . Six frequency parameters were selected for testing purposes. The resistance of the electrical detonator was 2.5 , and the resistance of the The other test parameters are listed in Table 3 .
The distances between the signal generator and the electric explosion network were tested from far to near according to the test parameters. The signals of the different frequencies were transmitted for ten seconds. The experimental tests were conducted according to the selected test parameters. For example, an electric detonator was placed into an explosion-proof iron drum, and then connected to an induction coil, as shown in Fig. 11 . In the test of Signal Transmitter I, the induced area of the corresponding electrical explosion network had gradually decreased from 1.32 m 2 . Signal Transmitter II had gradually decreased from 0.78 m 2 , and the distances and frequencies were set according to Table 3 . The induced current of the electrical explosion network was tested, and the state of the detonator was observed during the testing process.
The following test results were achieved in this study: For the Signal Transmitter I, when the induction area of the electrical explosion network was 1.32 m 2 and the distance was less than 0.2 m, the electrical detonator had exploded at different transmission frequencies of the signal transmitter. However, the electrical detonator was safe when the distances were greater than 0.2 m. Also, when the induction areas of the electrical explosion network were 1.00 m 2 and 0.70 m 2 , respectively, and the distance was 0 m, the electrical detonator had exploded at different transmission frequencies of the signal transmitter. However, it was safe when the distance was more than 0 m. Therefore, it was determined that when the induction areas of the electrical detonation network were less than 0.50 m 2 , the electrical detonators were safe at different distances and frequencies of Signal Transmitter I. For the Signal Transmitter II, when the induction areas of the explosion network were 0.78 m 2 and 0.63 m 2 , respectively, and the distance was 0 m, the electrical detonator had exploded at different transmission frequencies of the signal transmitter. However, the electrical detonator was observed to be safe when the distances were more than 0 m. When the induction areas of the electrical explosion network were less than 0.50 m 2 , it was the same as above. The test results of the induced current in the explosion network showed that when the distances between the signal transmitter and the explosion network were more than 0.4 m, the induced current was less than the Chinese standard current of 450 mA [31] . The chamber (blasting-hole) provided enough space to make the distance between the signal transmitter and the explosion network greater than 0.4 m. In summary, the electrical detonator was determined to be safe when the power of the signal transmitter was ≤120 W and the induction areas of the electrical explosion network were less than 0.5 m 2 . Moreover, the non-electrical initiation networks would not affect the security of the blasting misfire detections using the frequency division multiple access method.
V. DISCUSSION

A. RESEARCH NEEDS
At present, in the research field of misfire detections and identifications in engineered mine blasting processes, the technologies related to traditional experience discriminant methods and the indirect misfire identification method, combined with blasting vibration signal analysis and application methods using geophysical prospecting technology to detect misfires, have all been pushing forward in the direction of simple operation, strong adaptability, high rates of identification accuracy, high efficiency, and low cost. In particular, the present study applied the theory of electromagnetic wave propagation to the misfire detections, then proposed, verified, and applied an FDMA misfire detection method which combined signal detection and analysis technology. The results indicated that the proposed method could successfully and accurately identify blasting misfires, and meet the requirements of engineering practices. The accurate detections and identifications of misfires are pre-conditions for mine processes, and also the guarantee of safety production projects. There have been many reports made regarding the causes and treatment methods of misfires [32] - [36] . The causes of misfires involve both human factors and non-human factors. Although the occurrences of misfire accidents can be reduced by optimizing blasting parameters, as well as by improving blasting materials, strict construction management practices, and other auxiliary methods, this type of potential safety hazard cannot be entirely eliminated, particularly in large-scale geotechnical blasting projects. Therefore, in order to ensure the safety of blasting projects and prevent the occurrences of misfire accidents, using misfire detections as an effective safety means to prevent misfire accidents is imperative [37] .
B. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT MEASURES
This study has the following limitations: The rapid detection and identification system is designed for rock and soil blind cannons, and applied only to deep hole and chamber blasting. In addition, the signal transmitter is relatively large in volume, and is not suitable for shallow holes blasting with a hole diameter of less than 50 mm and a depth of less than 5 m. The general deep-hole blasting and chamber blasting engineering were performed far away from the town, and the electromagnetic environment facing was relatively simple, while the electromagnetic environment of the blasting construction misfire in the town was complicated. This caused the signal interference factor to increase, and the system requires further study. The signal receiving antenna and signal processing terminal were connected by cables, which limited the scope of the detection area. Finally, the traditional blasting construction process was relatively extensive and the process was simple, while the deployment of the misfire detection system was bound to increase the production cost and reduce the construction efficiency.
In view of the above limitations, some improvement measures are proposed, including reducing the size of the signal transmitter to achieve deployment flexibility, enhancing signal transmission intensity and recognizability, and controlling production costs. The signal receiving antenna and signal processing terminal achieved wireless signal connection. The deployment of the blind cannon detection system was added to the blasting safety specification to achieve standardized management of the construction site.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND APPLICATION PROSPECTS
Future research will consider the coupling relationship of multiple transient eddy current fields, and develop the underground signal transmitter from one-dimensional to threedimensional, thereby simplifying the detection method. The function of the engineering blasting blind detection and identification analysis software will be optimized, to form a more friendly man-machine interactive interface. Combined with ultra-high radio frequency identification technology [38] , [39] , the misfire detection system is built into the Internet of Things to realize efficient and intelligent detection and identification of misfire. Considering the influence of large-scale water body on detection and recognition accuracy, future research will seek to improve the frequency division multiple access detection technology and system accuracy of detection and identification of underwater engineering blasting misfire; miniaturization of signal transmitters; the application of an energy-aware unloading framework [40] ; saving energy consumption of RFID-based misfire identification systems; research and development applicable to complex electromagnetic environments in urban areas; and demolition of the blasting misfire detection system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this research study, a fast detection and identification method for misfires in geotechnical blasting processes was introduced, which was based on Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) technology. Also, matching equipment was developed. Demonstrations were made from the aspects of theoretical analysis, feasibility studies, field tests, applications, and so on, and the following conclusions were reached: 1) In this study's theoretical analysis, and the testing and detections of the electromagnetic field propagation law of rock and soil masses, it was concluded that the lower the transmitting frequency was, the stronger the penetration ability would be, and the farther the propagation distance would be. The identification accuracy of the multiple frequency signals was observed to be improved by the spectral transformation and adjustments of the signal analysis length. 2) Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) could detect the existence of misfires at a linear distance of 225m. The results of this study's tests demonstrated that the signals could be effectively measured and the measured frequency band is 975-5025Hz, which met the requirements of the chamber misfire detections and identifications. The results of the signal discrimination tests showed that the detection accuracy could reach 2 Hz, and the existence of single or multiple misfires could be accurately detected and identified simultaneously and effectively.
3) The results of the field tests and applications of the misfire detection and identification in deep-hole blasting showed that the misfire identifications in adjacent blasting holes did not affect each other when the distance between blasting holes was 5 m. 4) From the results of the safety test, it can be concluded that the transmitter signal power is less than or equal to 120 W conditions. Provided that the sensing area of the network is less than a 0.5 m 2 detonator, the detonator will not explode, while a non-electric detonator network does not involve safety issues. As a final contribution, we provide a rapid detection and identification system for blasting misfire. Detailed field tests and reliable test results can be used to guide and promote the use of the rapid detection and identification system for blasting misfire, and thereby reduce blasting safety accidents. In future work, we plan to further reduce the volume of the misfire detection and recognition system, and improve the detection accuracy and adaptability of different sites. We believe that the findings of this study will be helpful to the community for application in wireless remote detection and identification systems in blasting engineering, so as to precisely solve the potential safety hazards of blasting misfire. BINBIN 
